ADA Mediation After Sutton, Murphy and Albertson by Levin, James
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
Winter 1999 
ADA Mediation After Sutton, Murphy and Albertson 
James Levin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs 





By Guest Columnist James Levin,J.D.
J udith Cohen's summary of the In-
terim ADA Mediation Standards in the
last issue of The Journal of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Employment ac-
knowledges the "skyrocketing" number
of cases mediated under the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA).' The
United States Supreme Court's recent
opinions in Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc.,2 Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., and Albertson, Inc. v. Kirkingberg
surprised many in the disability com-
munity by explicitly excluding an indi-
vidual from ADA coverage if she miti-
gates her mental or physical impair-
ment and the impairment as mitigated
no longer substantially limits a major
life activity. Will the Supreme Court's
narrowing interpretation of the defini-
tion of "disability" ground the "skyrock-
ets," or, as I suggest below, will the
number of mediations in ADA cases
continue to soar?
The ADA became law on July 26, 1992.
Since then, defendants have been over-
whelmingly successful in defending
ADA claims,5 although both plaintiffs
and defendants have found ADA liti-
gation costly, time-consuming, and
stressful. Defendants refusing to settle
ADA claims also risk negative public-
ity and damage to employee morale.
Mediation efforts, like those developed
by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
ADA Mediation Program6 and the
EEOC,7 show that mediation is an ef-
fective alternative that meets the needs
of employers and businesses as well as
the diverse community of individuals
protected by the Act. In the DOJ pro-
gram, for example, 83% of the cases
submitted to mediation have settled.
Mediation cuts through law's com-
plexities. Mediation is successful in
ADA claims, in part, because it can cut
through the complexities of the statute.
lb make a claim under the ADA, an
individual plaintiff must first prove that
she meets the statutory definition of
"disabled."9 This is different from other
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employment discrimination statutes
where a person, by virtue of his or her race,
age or other easily verifiable protected sta-
tus, falls within the purview of the relevant
discrimination statute.
Upon meeting the "disabled" threshold, an
individual seeking ADA protection must pass
a second threshold by proving that she is
"qualified" for the job she seeks or hopes to
retain. That is, she must prove she can per-
form the essential functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodations.10
Miscommunication, misperception, igno-
rance, misinformation, strained relation-
ships or some combination of the above
are often found at
the core of these
"second threshold"
disputes. For ex- Mediation i
ample, an employer
may not fully under- ifl
stand what reason-
able accommodation
is necessary or may throug
grossly overestimate
the cost of making ties of ti
such an accommo-
dation. Mediation
provides a forum to
clear up those mis-
understandings in ways that promote fair
and effective settlements.
These "second threshold" issues should
remain unaffected by the Court's opinions
in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson, which
focus on the Act's definition of disability.
Reversing a trend set by most courts of
appeals as well as the EEOC and DOJ
guidelines, the Supreme Court uses these
cases to find that an impaired person is
statutorily disabled only if the impairment,
in its corrected or mitigated state, sub-
stantially limits a major life activity.
This holding reduces the number of






guably, reduces opportunities to mediate
ADA claims. Yet, more than 40 million
Americans remain covered by the Act,"
and for these people and their employ-
ers, mediation will continue to flourish
as an effective and cost-saving means of
settling ADA claims.
Even greater incentive to mediate.
How, then, will Sutton, Murphy, and
Albertson affect the number of ADA cases
that will be mediated? The court's at-
tempt to narrow the definition of"disabil-
ity" makes ADA litigation more complex,
more costly, and more protracted. This
creates a greater incentive for parties to
consider mediation at the earlier stages
of litigation.
successful In Sutton, two myopicjob applicants seeking
s, in part, to be pilots failed
United Airline's un-
can cut corrected (i.e., without
complexi- glasses or contact
lenses) vision require-
statute. ment although their
visual acuity was 20/
20 orbetter when they
wore prescription
lenses. The Court, af-
firming the lower
court dismissal of the case for failure to state
a cause of action, held that the ADA's defini-
tion of "disability" did not apply to the plain-
tiffs because the ADA requires courts to as-
sess their disability in its mitigated state.
The plaintiffs' corrected vision did not
make them disabled under the ADA, al-
though their uncorrected, impaired vision
disqualified them from the positions they
sought at United Airlines. The applicants
were not regarded as having a disability -
an alternative statutory definition of "dis-
abled" - because they made no showing
that United Airlines regarded them as hav-
ing impairments that substantially limit
their major life activity of working.1 2
9
ADA mediation
In Murphy, UPS fired a truck mechanic
with hypertension because his blood
pressure in its unmedicated state ex-
ceeded the limits necessary to obtain a
Department of Transportation (DOT)
health certification. Reiterating its hold-
ing in Sutton, the Court found no disabil-
ity under the ADA because the
mechanic's blood pressure, when con-
trolled by medication, did not substan-
tially limit a major life activity. 3
In Albertson, the Court held that a truck
driver, nearly blind in one eye, also did
not meet the ADAs definition of disability.
abled" within the meaning of the ADA.
Such a result - protracted litigation at
great expense to all parties - clearly cre-
ates a compelling incentive for plaintiffs
to seek mediation. Importantly, media-
tion also remains attractive to defendants
because it provides a private forum in
which to engage in interest-based nego-
tiations that go beyond narrow legal
points while saving time and money.
Fewer ADA claims filed, more claims
mediated. Where does that leave us?
The Supreme Court's actions in Sutton,
Murphy, and Albertson narrow the class of
Here, as in the Sutton
and Murphy cases,
the Court focused in
part on a mitigating
factor - i.e., the truck
driver's unconscious
ability to compensate
for his monocular vi-
sion - to find that he
was not disabled un-
der the statute.
The Court's empha-
sis on mitigation in
these cases adds a
layer of legal com-
plexity to an al-
ready too complex
area of law. Yet, for
The court's attempt
to narrow the defini-




at the earlier stages
of litigation.
that very reason, mediation remains an
attractive alternative. Consider an am-
putee with a prosthesis who, through
hard work and extensive physical
therapy, has regained almost all her
mobility. Before this recent line of cases,
such a plaintiff would assert a claim, and
the case would likely move to a discus-
sion of the claimant's qualifications for
the position.
Now, using Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson
as ammunition, defendants may engage
claimants in a fact-intensive, expert-laden
inquiry into whether a plaintiff is "dis-
people protected by




ever, it should not
stem the growth in
the number of ADA
cases to be mediated.
First, these Supreme






cut through the legal
complexities and re-
duce the time and money parties spend to
litigate such cases.
Second, despite Sutton, Murphy and
Albertson, many ADA cases will continue
to focus on "essential job functions" and
"reasonable accommodations," issues fu-
eled by misunderstanding, misper-
ception, and miscommunication. Ac-
cordingly, such cases remain well suited
for mediation.
Third, the increased training of ADA me-
diators14 and the recent efforts to develop
ADA mediation standards (highlighted in
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment
I
the last issue of this Journal), will im-
prove the quality of mediators handling
ADA cases and give parties increased
confidence that mediation is efficient
and effective.
Finally, newly established programs like
those at DOJ and EEOC will continue to
promote and educate potential plaintiffs
and defendants about the many benefits
of mediation in ADA cases. *
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